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Respecting Difference: A Moral Commitment with Universalist Implications
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Respecting Difference: A Moral Commitment with Universalist Implications
Аннотация
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S258770110022341-7-1
DOI
10.18254/S258770110022341-7
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Nagl-Docekal Herta  
Должность: Universitätsprofessorin i. R., Dr.
Аффилиация: University of Vienna, Department of Philosophy
Адрес: Universitaetsstrasse 7, A – 1010 Wien, Austria, Europe
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Том 6 № 3
Аннотация

As calls for respect to difference represent a central objective of contemporary political movements, the essay examines how philosophy might contribute to elaborating a well-argued foundation for these demands. 

Part 1: On persons and individuals takes issue with the view that blames the contractual foundation of the constitutional state as well as Kant’s moral universalism for being “forgetful of context”.  

Part 2: The obligation to cultivate “a broad-minded way of thinking”explains the relevance of Kant’s reflections on the “sensus communis”.

Part 3: The ethical community discusses the thesis that it is only within the framework of a particular community that individuals are capable of developing their unique identity (Taylor, MacIntyre).     

Part 4: Within the framework of the constitutional state contends that by prioritizing “the just” over “the good” the modern state is capable of curbing social asymmetries. 

Part 5: Anticipating a global public discourse focuses on Kant’s conception of the “public”.    

 

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moral philosophy, ethics, ethical community, difference, person, Kant, sensus communis
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09.06.2022
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31.10.2022
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1 Current issues
2

One key concern of contemporary political movements that challenge the manifold forms of discrimination and oppression encountered by people not belonging to their country’s dominant social stratum is expressed in calls for respect to difference. The urgency of such calls is enhanced by the fact that practically all countries across the globe embrace a plurality of communities defined by ethnicity, culture, religion, or different “comprehensive doctrines” (to cite a term introduced by John Rawls1). As this concern has been taken up in social theory and political philosophy, one focus of critical analysis has been on concepts that maintain a homogenous view of society, and are thus bound to result in significant groups of people being treated as “the unthought, the unseen, and the unheard,” as Seyla Benhabib notes2. The thrust of this critique is, without doubt, legitimate. Problems arise, however, as we examine precisely which concepts are being rejected here. Discussing inconsistencies in the current debate, the following reflections explore in which way philosophy might contribute to elaborating a well-argued foundation for the demand that difference be respected.

1. John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, 573.

2. Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” in Seyla Benhabib / Drucilla Cornell (eds.), Feminism as Critique. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press 1987, 92.
3

On persons and individuals
4

In the course of the controversy over “communitarianism versus liberalism” that has evolved since the late 1970s, many authors have blamed theories of the modern constitutional state for advocating an abstract concept of the citizen that is “forgetful of context.”3 One particular target of this critique is John Rawls’s claim, elaborated in his Theory of Justice (1971), that, in order to establish a “well-ordered society,” we need to conceive, in a hypothetical manner, an “original contract” between citizens who are placed “behind a veil of ignorance.”4 Since Rawls explains this thesis with reference to Kant’s concept of the social contract, and the way it is based on the categorical imperative, it has become a received opinion that, as we seek to promote respect for difference, a sweeping dismissal of Kant’s moral philosophy is imperative. For instance, Seyla Benhabib, in her essay “The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” claims that the “dominant Western” standpoint, i.e., “the universalist moral theory,” represents the standpoint of the “the generalized other” that requires us “to abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other”. This approach needs to be confronted, she argues, from “the standpoint of the concrete other” that “requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution.”5

3. Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice. Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2002 (henceforth cited as LC), 3.

4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971 (henceforth cited as TJ), 12 and 136-42.

5. Benhabib 1987, 87.
5 This kind of dichotomy proves unwarranted, however. Taking a fresh look at Kant’s own explanation of the categorical imperative, we find that it differs decisively from the way in which “Kantianism” is portrayed by critics inspired by communitarian views. It is not the primary intention of this paper, however, to set the record straight in terms of the history of philosophy. The main concern is rather to demonstrate that Kant, in fact, provides a sound foundation for the call for respecting difference. Most importantly, Kant’s approach implies a comprehensive concern for difference, as he contends that we are obliged to promote proactively, as much as possible, the flourishing of different forms of life that are based on particular concepts of the “good life.”
6 With regard to the fact that Kant’s concept of the “person” has often been criticized for portraying the human being as an “unencumbered self,”6 we need to consider that, by contrast, Kant’s concept of the “person” is closely tied up with human individuality. It is important to note two aspects:
6. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1982, 50.
7 Firstly, the concept “person” addresses a capacity that all human beings share: Kant defines the “person” — in contra-distinction to a “thing” — by the capability to act. Human beings are persons due to their capacity for decision making, i.e., for choosing their ends on their own.7 While all the existing “things” have “merely a relative worth,” only “persons” may claim to have “an inner worth, that is, dignity”8. As Kant explains, “everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised beyond all price and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity”9. Thus, by virtue of the capacity to make decisions each human being has “absolute worth”10. In our everyday lives, Kant maintains, we have this difference in mind whenever we judge actions from a moral perspective. We are able to make such judgments because our practical reason provides us with a moral principle that focuses on the absolute value of the human being. Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative intends to spell out, in a philosophically consistent manner, what we have already performed in our moral judgments. According to one of the transcriptions of the categorical imperative provided by Kant, our practical reason tells us: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely”11. In this manner our practical reason imposes upon us the duty to respect the dignity of every human being.
7. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of The metaphysics of morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (henceforth cited as GM). In: Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (37-108), 79; 4:428. In the following, all citations from Kant will additionally refer to the original German edition: Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Preussische/ Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften 1910-1968, specifying volume and page.

8. GM, 84; 4:435.

9. GM, 84; 4:434.

10. GM, 79; 4:428.

11. GM, 80; 4:429.
8 One crucial implication of this duty is that, with regard to any action that we consider carrying out, we need to ask whether the persons who will be affected by that action can, or do in fact, give their consent to our way of treating them12. Viewed from the perspective of the addressee, the categorical imperative justifies my claim that I must never be treated merely as a “thing” which may be made use of for the purposes of others — i.e. my demand to be acknowledged as a person. This perspective implies, as Kant points out, that we have the right to assert our worth as a human being in relation to others — a right which amounts to the “duty expressed by the saying, ‘Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them’.”13 It is evident that the categorical imperative provides the legitimation for a policy of resisting any form of treating us in a way that limits our self-determination without good reasons for doing so.14
12. Cf. GM, 80; 4:430.

13. Immanuel Kant, The metaphysics of morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (henceforth cited as MM). In: Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (353-603), 62.

14. The relevance of these considerations for a philosophical theory of feminist politics is discussed in: Herta Nagl-Docekal, Feminist Philosophy, trans. Katharina Vester. Boulder, CO: Westview 2004, 133-40.
9 In this context Kant also explains that the concept of human rights is morally grounded. He notes that “he who transgresses the rights of human beings intends to make use of the person of others merely as a means, without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they are always to be valued at the same time as ends, that is, only as beings who must also be able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action”15.
15. GM, 80; 4:430.
10 Secondly, we need to consider that, in treating human beings as “persons,” we acknowledge their individuality. Our capability to act enables us to interact with others, as we are immersed in manifold social settings from the very beginning of our existence. Through these interactions we lead our lives in a way that makes each of us unique. One author who carefully analyses the way in which individuality is created through (inter)action is Hanna Arendt. Drawing upon Kant, she defines “action” as the ability of us human beings to “begin, on our own initiative, something new.”16 It is on the basis of this ability, Arendt explains, that we shape our unique selves — “and it is uniqueness that the human being contributes to society in word and deed”17. Thus our status as “persons” entails individual diversification.
16. Hannah Arendt, “Arbeiten, Herstellen, Handeln.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 46 (1998), 1007 (henceforth cited as AH).

17. Explaining this matter, Arendt refers to the theological conception of creatio ex nihilo. See: Hannah Arendt, Vom Leben des Geistes, vol. 2: Das Wollen. München: Pieper 1979, 107. A detailed account of her analysis of action is provided in: Hauke Brunkhorst, Hannah Arendt. München: Beck 1999, 116-47.
11 Exploring the diverse aims of our actions, Kant specifies one decisive reason for our singularity. He maintains that our quest for happiness brings about differentiation. While all humans share the intention of leading a happy life, they differ remarkably in where they seek their happiness. “To be happy is necessarily the demand of every rational but finite being,” Kant states; yet, “in what each has to put his happiness comes down to the particular feeling of pleasure and in each”18. As Kant emphasizes, it is impossible to provide a single, universally valid notion of happiness, “for happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination”19. It must not go unnoticed that current social philosophy maintains a similar thought in emphasizing that our quest for a “good life” cannot be defined by one general idea shared by every human being. (We will return to this issue below.)
18. Immanuel Kant, Critique of practical reason. In: Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (133-272), 159; 5:25.

19. GM, 71; 4:418.
12 The fact that our status as “persons” entails individual diversification proves relevant as we ponder what we are required to do if we intend to implement the moral principle. Obviously, the duty to respect human dignity implies that we need to be sensitive for the uniqueness of the individual — or, more precisely, to strive for a continuous improvement of this kind of sensitivity.
13 The obligation to cultivate a “broad-minded way of thinking”
14 Expounding what, exactly, it means to treat a human being “as an end,” i.e., to acknowledge the faculty of humans to determine their ends for themselves, Kant specifies two different guidelines that follow from our basic moral duty. The first has the form of a prohibition, as discussed above: We must never treat human beings (others as well as ourselves) merely as a means for our own purposes. The second has the form of a precept that reaches beyond the scope of this prohibition: We must support others, as far as possible (and morally permissible), on their self-chosen paths to happiness. As Kant emphasizes, we would fail to grasp the full extent of our moral obligation if we were to restrict it to the idea that we must not harm human beings. In this context, Kant contends that the “Golden Rule” does not capture the idea of morality in the entire range of its implications: “Let it not be thought that the trite ‘quod tibi non vis fieri, etc.’ can serve as norm of principle here. For it, with various limitations, only derived from the latter: It can be no universal law because it contains the ground neither of duties to oneself nor of duties of love to others”20. Elaborating the notion “duties of kindness” (or rather “duties of love,” which would be a more adequate translation of the term Liebespflichten used in the German text of the Groundwork), Kant develops his thesis of “the happiness of others as an end that is also a duty”21. In this context, Kant clearly addresses our obligation to respect difference: in accordance with his general view on happiness (as outlined above) he explains that, while it is our duty to further the ends of others, “[i]t is for them to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness”22.
20. GM, 80; 4:430.

21. MM, 524; 6:393.

22. MM, 519; 6:388.
15 In fact, both moral guidelines call for attentiveness towards the individual in his or her uniqueness. Unless we strive to perceive the given situation from the perspective of the addressees of our intended action, we cannot hope to assess properly the impact which this action is likely to have. Rejecting any solipsistic concept of comprehension, Kant coins the term “logical egotism”23. Yet, which of our faculties is it that enables us to recognize the diversity of individual perspectives? As Arendt points out,24 valuable categories for a philosophical assessment of this faculty may be gained from Kant’s theory of the power of judgment, specifically from his (re-)reading of the concept sensus communis.25 Kant suggests that “by ‘sensus communis’ […] must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e. the faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. Now this happens by […] putting himself in the position of everyone else”26. Explaining the latter aspect, he stresses the need “to think in the position of everyone else”27. It is only by following this maxim that we are able to detach ourselves from the “subjective private conditions” of our judgments and to develop “a broad-minded way of thinking”28. Arendt interprets these Kantian reflections as pointing out “an extra sense that fits us into a community”29. Discussing the implications of Kant’s concept of the “enlarged mind,”30 Arendt maintains that “communication” is the crucial feature here: “The ‘sensus communis’ is the specifically human sense because communication, i.e. language, depends on it”31. In other words, “one can communicate only if one is able to think from the other person’s standpoint”32.
23. In German: “logische Egoisterei.” See Immanuel Kant, Logik Blomberg. Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: Preussische/ Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften 1910-1968, vol. XXIV, 151.

24. See for instance Hannah Arendt, “Crisis in Culture.” Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Meridian 1961, 220-21.

25. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (henceforth cited as CJ). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, 173-176.

26. CJ, 173-174; 5:293-294.

27. CJ, 174; 5:294.

28. CJ, 175; 5:295.

29. Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1982 (henceforth cited as LK), 70.

30. Arendt uses the term „enlarged mind“ with reference to an earlier English translation: Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford University Press at The Clarendon Press 1952, 150-154. Due to the fact that the Meredith translation has been widely used, the term “enlarged mind” is a received concept not only in specific research on Kant’s theory of aesthetics. The German translation of “sensus communis” that Kant introduces reads: “erweiterte Denkungsart”.

31. LK, 70.

32. LK, 74.
16 Regarding the first (prohibitive) guideline implied in the categorical imperative, we need to consider, for instance, that there are many cases of human interaction in which the harm that is inflicted upon individuals or groups remains largely invisible — sometimes even to those who are affected. In particular, common views and social norms that have long been held and applied in practice tend to impede our perception of their harmful effects. Traditional gender relations are a case in point. Onora O’Neill addresses the fact that there are numerous forms of common interaction in which women are assumed to give their consent while this is in fact not the case. One example is the workplace, where women are often seen as freely accepting contracts that put them in an underprivileged position compared to their male co-workers. We need to consider, O’Neill argues, that the concept “consent” does imply voluntariness — only when the possibility of not consenting is given can we say that someone has consented to a given way of proceeding. Therefore it is imperative to investigate the specific situation of the women in question, and to ask whether other options for earning their living are available to them. If this is not the case, the signing of their unfavorable contracts [can no longer be portrayed as based upon an act of decision making, and it becomes apparent that what actually happens] is a form of the forced exploitation of women.33 Referring to Kant’s categorical imperative, O’Neill emphasizes: “A full understanding of treating others as persons should […] take some account of the particularities of persons […]. Even when others do not deceive or coerce us, or treat us in any way as tools, we may yet feel that they do not treat us as persons either.”34
33. Onora O’Neill, “Between Consenting Adults,” O’Neill, Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989, 105-25.

34. O’Neill 1989, 111.
17 The second moral guideline — which instructs us to further, as much as possible, the happiness of others — obviously also urges us to be sensitive to the specific needs and aims of individuals. Considering this obligation, it is important to address the danger of a patronizing attitude. In response to the fact that the claim that aid or support is being provided to others is often marked by a propensity to overrule the addressees’ capability for self-determination, Kant notes, “I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concept of happiness (except to young children and the insane); […] rather I can benefit him only in accordance with his concepts of happiness.”35 From a contemporary perspective, Axel Honneth, in his book Freedom’s Right (2014), points out that traditional practices of child-rearing are commonly marked by a patronizing approach. By contrast, he advocates the transformation that has been evolving within the modern family, noting that “a previously silent third person has now been recognized and included as an independent entity. Father and mother no longer negotiate ‘over’ their children, but whenever possible ‘with their’ children”36. As is well known, patronizing practices have been an issue not only in the privacy of personal relations but also on a global scale: Measures described as “aid to underdeveloped regions” often involve people in those regions being forced to adopt Western concepts and standards that are at odds with their own notions of a good life.
35. MM, 573; 6:454. A precise philosophical assessment of paternalism is provided by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. New York: Cross Road 1982, 322.

36. Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. New York: Columbia University Press 2014, 158.
18 The ethical community
19 The above reflections have characterized the relation between morality and difference primarily in terms of individuals listening to other individuals articulating their specific needs, anxieties, interests, hopes, etc. However, this is only one aspect of that relation: we also have to consider the relevance of the communities in which the individuals are embedded. In fact, the mainstream of current political calls for the respect of difference focuses primarily on the differences between communities defined by particular forms of life. Thus the question arises whether a tension might emerge here: Is respect for individual uniqueness always fully compatible with respect for the unique form of communal life?
20 Let us first recall the importance of what has been termed, in recent social philosophy, “ethical community.” Referring in particular to Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, Rainer Forst summarizes this concept in the following way: from the very beginning of our lives we are imbedded in communities that introduce us into a particular world which is based upon shared values. As members of such an “ethical community,” we adopt a common view of the world which constitutes a “framework of strong evaluations” that provides us with practical orientation. These shared values differ from universal moral norms, as they address what is “good for us”37 in terms of our common self-understanding.38 The family as well as communities defined by ethnicity, culture, religion or various comprehensive teachings are usually cited as paradigms of this type of communal life. Since the shared values are implemented in a set of social practices derived from them, ethical communities are structured by conventional, complementary social roles. As one crucial thesis highlights, it is only within the framework of such a shared communal life that individuals are capable of developing their “unique life history”39. The term “constitutive community”40 signifies that individuals, in order to gain their self-understanding, need to be esteemed and recognized by others who embody the same collective identity. Thus “one’s own most particular individuality is defined and constituted […] through community with others”41 in a process that is not without tensions, though, as “the identity of persons is formed in the force field between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’.”42
37. LC, 283.

38. “Here no moral ought sentences are formulated that raise a claim to reciprocally and generally non-rejectable validity,” Forst notes (LC, 260).

39. LC, 258.

40. LC, 259.

41. LC, 285.

42. LC, 284.
21 Taking a closer look at these reflections on the “ethical community,” we find good reasons for both affirmative and critical responses. On the one hand, it certainly proves to be a valid claim that being imbedded in a particular world, based upon shared values and respective social practices, constitutes a prerequisite for the formation of individual identity. On the other hand, however, we need to consider that, in real life, conventional ethical communites imply a potential for discrimination and oppression with regard to internal as well as external relations. For instance, as feminist research has pointed out, common gender roles have created asymmetrical relations, with women being placed in subordinate positions in the family as well as society at large. In more general terms, Kant, in his Doctrine of Virtue, emphasizes that where “custom, mos, is raised to the dignity of a law […], a tyranny of popular mores” is likely to result.43 Additional problems arise from the fact that conventional ethical communities, typically, define their shared identity by operating with the distinction of “we” and “the others”. It is beyond doubt that this kind of external delimination carries with it a propensity for an attitude of superiority and for humiliating practices of exclusion, as addressed in the introduction to the present paper.
43. MM, 581; 6:464.
22 As we face the internal and external asymmetries that mark traditional communities, it is obvious that people who suggest that current phenomena of individuals becoming isolated and anonymous ought to be overcome by adopting, in a wholesale manner, conventional ways of communal life, fail to be sensitive to the manifold human suffering that these forms of life have caused. By contrast, Kant’s conception of morality – with its focus on the equal dignity of each person – provides a well-argued basis for the critical analysis of such social asymmetries.44 Yet, how can this duty be properly implemented? The existence of constitutional states is of vital importance with regard to the task of effectively curbing both sets of social asymmetries.
44. It is important to note that the term “ethical community” is defined by Kant in a way that differs decisively from the usage addressed here. Underscoring that “[t]he concept of an ethical community is the concept of a people of god under ethical laws”, Kant introduces this term in his philosophical interpretation of what a “church” is all about. See: Immanuel Kant, Religion within the boundaries of mere reason. In: Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, eds. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (39-216), 133, 135; 6:99, 6:100. For an in-depth analysis of this topic, including the issue whether Kant’s concept of the “ethical community” might claim relevance today even for agnostics and atheists see: Herta Nagl-Docekal, “Why Kant’s Ethical State might Prove Instrumental in Challenging Current Social Pathologies”, in: Kantian Journal 40(2021) 4, 156-186.
23 Within the framework of the constitutional state
24 First, it is important to consider that the contractual conception of the modern state must not be understood in terms of a social anthropology that views individuals as “unencumbered selves.” As Rawls emphasizes, the idea of the parties situated “behind the veil of ignorance” rather represents “a hypothetical situation,” the aim of which is “to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just.” Since the parties “do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case […], they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.”45 This basic idea of the constitutional state proves relevant with regard to the issues of difference discussed here in various ways. However, only a brief sketch can be provided here.
45. TJ, 136-38.
25 1.With regard to the internal asymmetries just addressed, the core principles of equality and liberty provide the crucial basis for the protection of individuals from being oppressed within traditional social arrangements. As Rawls emphasizes, it is the clear achievement of the modern rule of law to prioritize “the just” over “the good” (as defined by ethical communities). Thus, the protective force of the liberal state is defined primarily in negative terms, as it aims at warding off attacks on equality and liberty. One significant implication is that the state secures the right of exit from oppressive communities. 2. The constitutional state also represents a forceful framework that allows particular communities to live according to their shared values, albeit on the basis of respecting the right of all co-existing groups to do the same. In fact, the modern state is capable of addressing issues of community in an affirmative manner in several regards. 2.1 First of all, it is the very principle of “the ethical neutrality of law”46 that allows for state support to be granted to diverse particular communities. Forst explains this implication of the contractual framework as follows: “It is precisely the mode of reciprocally and generally justifying general norms that makes it possible to do justice to the communitarian concern for recognizing particular, communal, as well as ‘different’ ethical identities”47. Further elaboration of this point is provided by Daniel Bell, who notes that “individuals have a vital interest in leading decent communal lives, with the political implication that there may be a need to sustain and promote the communal attachments crucial to our sense of well-being.”48 Following this line of thought, states may, for instance, consider it a matter of justice to grant public funds to institutions owned by religious communities, such as schools or hospitals. 2.2 Additionally, the general principles of equality and liberty provide a guideline for people who are striving for internal reforms of “ethical communities,” so as to overcome their hierarchical implications. As is well known, efforts to this effect have already been taken up in the context of different cultures – for instance, with the aim of replacing oppressive gender relations within the family as well as in the spheres of the economy, politics and religion.
46. LC, 30.

47. LC, 231.

48. Daniel Bell, “Communitarianism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016, (1-19) 9.
26 However, as we observe concrete efforts by states to promote communal difference, we once again encounter a propensity to adopt a patronizing and humiliating attitude. As a foundation for the elimination of this problem, a specific legal framework is required that establishes and protects the equal right of everybody to express his/ her opinion in an unrestricted manner. For Kant there is no doubt that the moral perspective generates the need for regulations entitling everyone to “the freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters”49. Accordingly, John Rawls defines freedom, including the “freedom of speech and assembly,” as a “primary social good”50. As we examine what, exactly, is required for a coherent implementation of this claim, we find that a whole bundle of measures is called for. Most importantly, the sphere of social rights is of relevance here. For instance, individuals who lack a minimal level of education — as illiterate persons placed in the context of a society with a higher average standard of education — may find it extremely difficult to make their voices heard. Therefore, a politics that seeks to heed difference in a fully inclusive manner must make social justice one of its core concerns. Recent research has provided valuable concepts in this regard, ranging from “equality of chances” through to “affirmative action”.
49. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (henceforth cited as WE) In: Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (11-22), 18; 8:36.

50. TJ, 61, 191.
27 Anticipating a global public discourse
28 As Kant introduces his concept of the “public”51, he has a pluralist exchange of opinions in mind that brings about a general process of learning. He observes that it is “difficult for any single individual,”52 on his/her own, to properly bring to bear the faculty of reason on given concrete matters – “there are only a few who have succeeded, by their own cultivation of their spirit, in extricating themselves from minority”53. By contrast, Kant considers the communication process of a “public” to have the potential of enhancing the accuracy of our understanding. He articulates this point in the most comprehensive way as he contends that for our thinking — in the field of theoretical as well as practical issues — to gain clarity we depend to a large extent on unrestricted public discourse. He argues: “Of course it is said that the freedom to speak and to write could be taken from us by superior power, but the freedom to think cannot be. Yet how much and how correctly would we think if we did not think as it were in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us!”54
51. WE, 17; 8:36.

52. WE, 17; 8:36.

53. WE, 17, 8:36.

54. Immanuel Kant, What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? In: Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (1-18), 12; 8:144.
29 Kant’s concept is inclusive in a double sense: not only does it advocate the idea of everybody’s unrestricted access to public discourse; it also implies that none of the diverse issues which are on people’s minds is to be excluded in advance — as Anderson-Gold points out, Kant’s understanding of communication “prohibits no topics.”55 Furthermore, the temporal aspect of morality becomes apparent here: As Kant attributes to public discourse the potential to promote the clarity of our thinking, he highlights the fact that people engaging in a communication process typically feel the need to differentiate their categories, i.e., to improve the adequacy of their language. With regard to moral issues this implies that, as we gradually perform such meliorations, our moral judgment will increasingly reach a higher degree of sophistication.
55. Sharon Anderson-Gold, “Evil and Enlightenment in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.” In: Recht – Geschichte – Religion. Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart, eds. Herta Nagl-Docekal and Rudolf Langthaler. Berlin: Akademie 2004, 120.
30 With regard to contemporary conditions, Jürgen Habermas has made the concept of “public discourse” more precise by introducing the term “rational discourse”56. Since today’s societies, he argues, typically are not based upon one shared set of convictions, such as religious teachings, their members need to provide reasons, as they seek to communicate their opinions with regard to problems caused by conflicting interests.57Adopting thoughts expressed by Max Weber, Habermas has coined the term “rationalization of the life world”58 in order to capture the particular feature of modernity that necessitates the exchange of reasons. As Lutz Wingert explains, “justifying reasons are the signposts along the path that we need to take in order to achieve comprehension.”59 With this specific understanding in mind, Habermas elaborates what a contemporary political community needs to do in order to reach a just way of dealing with any given conflict among its members. He specifies one formal principle, as a guideline, re-formulating the basic Kantian line of thought: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses”60.
56. See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.Cambridge: MIT Press 1996 (henceforth cited as FN).

57. FN, 107-108.

58. See: Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1: Reason and Rationalization of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon 1984.

59. Transl. H.N-D. “Rechtfertigende Gründe sind die Markierungen des Weges, den wir durchlaufen müssen, um zu Einsichten zu gelangen.” Lutz Wingert, “Jürgen Habermas: Faktizität und Geltung – Der Prozess des Rechts in den Satzungen der Macht.” Klassische Werke der Philosophie. Von Aristoteles bis Habermas, eds. Reinhardt Brandt and Thomas Sturm, Leipzig: Reclam 2002, 352.

60. FN, 107.
31 Obviously, the scope of our moral obligations is not limited to the one state in which we live. Significantly, Kant’s concept of the “public” suggests a global perspective: Emphasizing that “sociability” is the crucial feature of “humanity,” he argues that “a regard to universal communicability is a thing which everyone expects and requires from everyone else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself”61. This concern has specific significance in our age, which is marked by a rapid process commonly called “globalization.”62 Situated in an earlier phase of this development, Kant — in the course of critically portraying the colonialism of his time — has already pointed out that, through the increase of worldwide relations, we are confronted with moral problems occurring in very distant parts of the globe. He observes: “Since the (narrower or wider) community of the nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right.”63. In view of today’s worldwide presence of the mass media, we can add that — apart from transgressions of rights — also the despair and destitution caused by disease and natural disaster “in one place of the world” are “felt everywhere.” In more general terms, the dense network of relations existing today means that we are facing moral problems from all over the world that relate to both implications of the categorical imperative: to the prohibition, according to which no one must be treated merely as a means, as well as to the precept specified under the heading “duties of kindness.” Therefore, Benhabib seems to voice a legitimate demand as she insists that, since we are “caught in a net of interdependence,” we “have to become moral contemporaries.”64
61. CJ, 155.

62. The term “globalization” is used here in a broad sense which covers relations in a variety of fields, including science and culture. In current everyday language, this term often has a more narrow meaning with a clearly negative ring; in that case it refers to the economic and political dynamic defined by neo-liberal concepts.

63. Immanuel Kant, Toward perpetual peace. In: Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (311-352), 330; 8:360.

64. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2002, 36.

Библиография

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2. Arendt, Hannah. Arbeiten, Herstellen, Handeln. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 46 (1998).

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5. Arendt, Hannah. Vom Leben des Geistes, vol. 2: Das Wollen. München: Pieper 1979, 107. A detailed account of her analysis of action is provided in: Hauke Brunkhorst, Hannah Arendt. München: Beck 1999. P. 116-147.

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8. Benhabib, Seyla. The Generalized and the Concrete Other. In: Seyla Benhabib / Drucilla Cornell (eds.), Feminism as Critique. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press 1987.

9. Forst, Rainer. Contexts of Justice. Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2002.

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22. Nagl-Docekal, Herta. Why Kant’s Ethical State might Prove Instrumental in Challenging Current Social Pathologies. In: Kantian Journal. 2021. Vol. 40.

23. O’Neill, Onora. Between Consenting Adults. In: O’Neill, O. Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. P. 105-125.

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25. Rawls, John. Collected Papers. Ed. Samuel Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

26. Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

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